Introduction

The objective of this section is to provide a framework for the colleagues of the frontline negotiator to assist and support the development of the negotiation strategies and tactics.

Frontline negotiation is understood across the humanitarian community as a relational undertaking involving the humanitarian negotiator and his/her counterpart(s) in a search for common grounds to ensure the provision of essential assistance and protection to populations in need. The relational character of this activity is seen by practitioners as a core element in building trust between individuals and organizations in situations of armed conflict and violence. Building on their personal connection, negotiators on both sides are able to ascertain their shared interests to drive the negotiation process forward.

One side effect of this personalization of the relationship is that decisions on the orientation of the negotiation process are often made primarily by those negotiators involved at a personal level. Humanitarian negotiations can easily turn into private dealings if the process is not integrated into a professional and critical endeavour, as the scope of interests and the stakes at play are usually much larger and more far-reaching than the ones envisaged by the individuals in their relationships. The larger picture may have considerable implications in terms of the lives and dignity of thousands of people, as well as the reputation, safety, and security of a whole organization.

The team-effort model is an effective way for solo practitioners to maintain their autonomy as frontline negotiators while making a responsible and professional decision to open a critical collaborative space around them in the planning process of the negotiation. The deliberation within the support team aims to ensure the maintenance of the required critical space to define and regularly review the objectives of the negotiation process and inform the design of the tactical plan (see Figure 1).

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team 

Introduction

The purpose of this segment is to analyze the underlining reasoning and motives of the counterpart that may explain the position of the parties in a negotiation process. This analysis builds on the assessment of the political, social, and humanitarian context.

The analysis of the position of the counterpart(s), as well as the understandings and perceptions of the constituency of the counterparts, will inform the development of the position of the humanitarian organization and facilitate the design of the tactical plan by its negotiation team (see 2 | Module B: Identifying Your Own Priorities and Objectives). They will help to identify points of convergence and divergence between the positions of the parties related to a specific negotiation. This assessment will further inform the type of negotiation to be envisaged—whether political, professional, or technical in nature—and the selection of the skills required—conciliation skills, consensus-building skills, or specific technical abilities (see 1 | Module B: Tactical Plan).

The first step of this analysis is to ascertain or take note of the position of the counterpart (WHAT is the position of the counterpart?):

• In normal circumstances, the analysis begins with recognition of the starting position of the counterpart on the issue of the negotiation. This position is communicated from the outset of the negotiation process to humanitarian negotiators directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, depending on the context, situation, and culture. At first, the position may not be very clear due to poor communication. Also, the agent transmitting the position may not carry much authority, due to, for example, having only a weak or dubious connection with the decision makers. Finally, the timing, location, or format of the communication may appear to be confusing or odd, raising questions about the authoritativeness of the communication, i.e., to what extent this communication represents the position of the counterpart or not. The context analysis step further informs this process and helps to identify the position of the counterpart. A minimum of clarity and authority must be recognized before moving forward with the analysis (see the three-pronged test in 2 | Module B: Identifying Your Own Priorities and Objectives).

A second step is to assess the reasoning of the counterpart in support of the position identified in the first step (HOW does the counterpart reach this position?):

• The tactical reasoning of the counterpart explains the logic and interest behind its position. This reasoning is tactical because it shapes the position without being its raison d’être and explains the logic through which a strategic goal or value of the counterpart is transformed into a position. Though seldom communicated by the counterpart, a member of the negotiation support team, a local staff person, or an acquaintance may elucidate the reasoning of the counterpart as part of an informal conversation. Knowledge about the reasoning of the counterpart is generally a strength, as it may help to build a new consensus on shared rational grounds. The aim of the conversation is to find a solution to the divergent, competing logical rationales rather than try to defeat the other side’s argument. Depending on the situation, it would be most conducive for discussions on the tactical reasoning of the counterpart to take place in informal quarters.

A third step is to deduce the inner motives and values directing and informing the reasoning of the counterpart (WHY has the counterpart taken such position?):

• The inner motives and values of the counterpart are definitely of a more sensitive nature than its tactical reasoning. They may raise considerable emotions (e.g., anger, frustration, hopes, fears), especially in tense conflict environments. Yet, they are of great importance as they frame the position of the counterpart in a mantle of strict values and norms that often impose significant limitations on its ability to negotiate and find a solution. By being aware of the counterpart’s inner motives and values, humanitarian negotiators can better understand the political underpinnings of the starting position as well as the red lines that frame the rational side of the argument. The point here is not to “reason” or rationalize inner motives and values, which remain more emotional than logical, but to observe and understand the dynamic impact these values may have on the negotiation strategies of the counterpart.

The iceberg model provides an interesting analogy for such analysis. Icebergs floating in the ocean reveal only a small part of the ice to the eyes of the observers; the rest of the ice is under water. For the observer on a boat, the size and shape of an iceberg can be deduced only from the visible portion of the ice emerging above the water. The deeper the iceberg goes, the more speculative the interpretation will be from the information gathered above water. The greater the observer ‘s understanding of the iceberg and its dynamic in the fluid environment, the more able the he/she will be to predict the movement of the iceberg.

The same goes for the analysis of the position of the counterpart in a negotiation process. The more complex the rationale and deeper the motives of the counterpart are, the more complicated the interpretation will become and the harder it will be to predict the evolution of the negotiation. This will consequently require the contribution of people and experts who know about the rationale and values of the counterpart to explain the reasoning behind the position and elucidate the motives and emotions involved. Ultimately, the conduct of a negotiation, as with navigating around icebergs, must foresee the dynamic of the counterpart and integrate some level of uncertainty in terms of its interests and motives hidden from view. Ignoring this analysis can come at great cost to the negotiation and parties to the negotiation. To illustrate such analysis, one may consider an example drawn from recent practice.

Before moving forward to deal with the main points of divergence with the guards (in particular, the freedom of movement and security of HfA staff), HfA negotiators will need to conduct a proper analysis of the position, tactical reasoning, and motives of the tribal leaders and the guards in order to prepare their negotiation tactics properly. In this case, questions to be examined include:

This analysis will help to identify an Island of Agreement (see 1 | Tool 2: Drawing the Island of Agreements) as one develops the tactical plan of the negotiation. It will also inform the design of options and sequencing of issues to be addressed in this specific situation.

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team

Introduction

The purpose of this segment is to explore ways to identify the priorities of a humanitarian organization in a negotiation process as well as its specific objectives within a given mandate. This module prepares for the transactional stage of the negotiation where possible options will be considered by the parties in the hope of finding an agreement.

This module builds on the analysis of position, tactical reasoning, and values of the counterpart presented earlier in Module A through the use of the “iceberg” template. It informs the tactical planning of one’s own organization for the negotiation table by setting the Common Shared Space (CSS) of the negotiation (see Module C). The main point of Module B is to support the development of a tactical plan that will allow for bridging the gap between the positions of the counterpart and those of one’s own organization.

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team | Module B: Priorities and Objectives

Tool 10: Identification of Your Own Priorities and Objectives

At the point of departure, priorities and objectives of a negotiation process are drawn from the strategic objectives and mission of the organization and the limitations entailed in its institutional policies guiding the options available to the negotiator. The mandate frames the negotiation process in terms of both of these aspects.

The objectives of the negotiation are generally the product of a discussion with the hierarchy of the organization. The mandate embodies the authority given by the hierarchy of the organization (the mandator) to the humanitarian negotiator (the mandatee) to negotiate in the name and for the benefit of the organization. The mandate specifies the objectives and limits of the tasks required from the mandatee, including the expected methods and reporting lines to be used. However, contrary to traditional instructions to staff or agents, the mandate provides a high degree of autonomy to the mandatee on how to conduct the negotiation within the limits set by the mandate. The concept of the mandate plays a critical role in this context. Compared to a representation role, the mandate of a negotiator provides significant space to explore options with the counterpart and delegates an authority to determine the best possible outcome of the negotiation within the limits set by the mandator.

There are many types of mandates in the humanitarian sector: states have mandated humanitarian organizations to offer their services in times of conflict; local authorities may mandate an NGO to manage a camp; patients may mandate a physician to undertake a life-saving surgery. There are also a number of internal mandates within an organization (in addition to instructions given to its employees and agents). Specific examples of the range of mandates: a nurse can be mandated to run a clinic; a pilot can be mandated to fly an aircraft; an architect can be mandated to build a hospital. These mandates accord a certain level of autonomy to the agents in their respective profession, while other actors (such as accountants, logisticians, radio operators, drivers, etc.) are instructed to function within tighter technical constraints.

Frontline humanitarian negotiation is a specific mandate given to designated staff that comes with considerable autonomy—but also with red lines. Negotiation mandates for certain representatives (e.g., head of office, team leader, country director, etc.) are often combined with parallel and more constrained responsibilities. The systematization of the methods of frontline humanitarian negotiators and the creation of a community of practitioners aim at increasing the level of autonomy of the mandatee within recognized professional standards. Section 3 | Tool 15: Design of the Mandate will elaborate the details of negotiation mandate. The aim of this module is to facilitate the identification of the priorities and specific goals of an organization in a negotiation process from the interpretation of the mandate of the negotiator.

To identify negotiation priorities and objectives, it may be useful to mirror the reasoning and motives analysis of the counterpart presented in the previous Module using the same iceberg, but this time focusing on one’s own organization, starting from its values and motives, to examining its tactical reasoning and professional standards, and finally ascending the iceberg to the position of the organization in the particular negotiation that will be communicated to the counterpart.

Based on the mandate received from the organization and looking into the context analysis, the main questions are therefore:

The logic of building one’s own iceberg is the reverse of interpreting the position of the counterpart. One can only interpret the tactical reasoning and motives of the counterpart starting from the counterpart’s position as communicated at the negotiation table. But to formulate one’s own humanitarian organization’s position, there is the advantage of having a known set of values and norms that informs the organization’s operational reasoning in the form of methods, professional standards, and programmatic objectives. These, in turn, will indicate the starting position of the humanitarian organization in the specific negotiation. This position is then communicated to the counterpart from the outset of the negotiation. Hence, the values and identity of the humanitarian organization serve as a bedrock for defining its reasoning and mode of operation, which will then establish a starting position on the technical modalities of the operation to be negotiated. It is important to build the organization’s iceberg in such a way as to be able to explain its position in a negotiation through the various angles at any point of the negotiation. This communication will also facilitate the passages between different types of negotiation, namely:

• From political negotiation about the organization’s values and identity (WHO are you? WHY are you here?);
• To a professional negotiation about tactics and modes of operation (HOW do you operate?);
• To a technical negotiation about the position on the modalities of the operation (WHAT do you need? WHERE will you work? WHEN will you start? etc.)

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team | Module A: Priorities and Objectives

Tool 11: Exploring the Common Shared Space

The purpose of this module is to open a space of exploration with the counterpart in terms of possible arrangements between the two parties so as to reach an agreement. It prepares for the transactional stage of the negotiation where possible options will be considered by the parties in the hope of finding an agreement.

This module builds on the analysis of interests and motives of counterparts and of one’s own organization presented earlier in the earlier Modules A and B through the use of the “iceberg” template. It informs the tactical planning by setting the Common Shared Space (CSS) that will in turn inform the location of the red line and bottom lines of the negotiation discussed in Module D. The main point of this module is to support the development of a tactical plan that will allow for bridging the gap between the position of the counterpart and those of our own organization.

Drawing the Common Shared Space

Humanitarian negotiation essentially involves the exploration of a shared space—as distinct from the “humanitarian space”—where parties to the negotiation can safely review values, methods, and parameters of a proposed operation. The more trustful and predictable the relationship is, the more fertile the exploration of potential areas of convergence will be. This search for convergence is in contrast with the work of humanitarian advocates whose role is to protect the humanitarian space and to convince the other side to respect the entitlements of the humanitarian organization.

To succeed, a negotiation must be more than a competition between two narratives. Parties must be able to generate a substantive dialogue on values, methods, and the details of relief and protection operations as a means to generate an implementable and impactful agreement. It involves an ability to distance oneself from his/her position—distancing from one’s own iceberg made of principles, methods, and positions—and meet the counterpart to explore opportunities of agreements.

Such an approach involves a shift of the ethos of humanitarian professionals from the original guardian of the humanitarian space to a new philosophy and attitude pertaining to negotiators. It may at times be a challenge for humanitarian professionals to distance themselves from their own values, norms, and methods in order to engage genuinely in an exercise of exploration of potential compromises with the counterparts. This module is designed to help humanitarian negotiators process the required information and develop the right attitude.

Since this Manual focuses on the specific role of the frontline negotiator, this segment will articulate legitimacy and trust through the viewpoint of the individual negotiators  rather than the ones of organizations and systems. The legitimacy of the humanitarian negotiator as well as the one of the counterpart play a critical role in the success of humanitarian negotiation. Major concessions are obtained by virtue of the personal status and skills of frontline negotiators. Conversely, misperceptions about the negotiator’s status or insufficient personal skills may be critical impediments to access in some conflict environments.  This point could easily undermine the confidence of many professionals in the field, as no one can feel totally assured that they have the status and personal skills required to seek access to people in need or feel certain that what they bring to the negotiation will be sufficient to guarantee the security of an operation.

Building on the analysis of both parties’ interests and motives (see 2 | Module A: Analysis of Interests and Motives and 2 | Module B: Identifying Your Own Priorities and Objectives) the negotiator is able to determine the distance between his/her organization and the counterpart. This space is composed not only of the shared possibilities, but of all the options, including those disagreeable to one or both of the sides. The goal of the dialogue between the parties is to sort out and understand their respective preferences and objections.

Figure 6: Defining the Common Shared Space of the Negotiation

Identifying the area of the negotiation therefore involves:

1. Communication of the respective positions of the parties (P) and (P’);
2. The ability to explain one’s tactical reasoning (R) and connect it to the reasoning of the counterpart (R’);
3. The openness to discuss one’s underlying values and norms (V) in a language and method that may relate to the values and identity of the counterpart (V’); and,
4. The recognition of the distance between the two sets of positions/methods/values in order to offer an opportunity for dialogue and improved understanding of the counterpart. In this Common Shared Space of the negotiation, which is co-owned by the negotiators, it is hoped that the parties are willing to find a compromise.

The negotiation should be presented as a process for the parties to explore ways to reconcile P, R and V with and P’, R’, and V’. For example:

Food Without Borders (FWB), an international NGO, is negotiating access to IDP camps with the Governor of a remote district of Country A. Because the rainy season has paralyzed access by road to the district, FWB is also seeking access to the local airstrip, which is under the control of the Governor. The movement of the food within the district will further require the security guarantees of the Governor and the leaders of the local militia under his control.

The object of the negotiation relates to access to IDP camps. This negotiation involves several technical issues, such as:

1. Landing rights for humanitarian flights;
2. Timing and itinerary of humanitarian convoys; and,
3. Location and number of beneficiaries within the population of the IDP camp.

The reliance on the agreement by the parties and its implementation involve operating procedures and methods that need to be clarified at the tactical reasoning level, respectively:

1. Common understanding on flight pathways and communication procedures;
2. Common protocols of checkpoints and communication procedures with the militia; and,
3. Common understanding on the terms of the presence and role of FWB staff in the IDP camp.

These elements of tactical reasoning are, in turn, inspired by the values and norms of the parties, hence:

1. Respect for the national sovereignty and control over airspace and air operations;
2. Respect for key principles in the distribution of the food to the IDPs; and,
3. Respect for the counterpart’s authority over the population and security of the camp.

In other words, while the agreement with the Governor may focus on technical issues, namely, the use of the airstrip, the movement of trucks within the district, and the operations in the IDP camps, the quality and durability of the agreement in terms of implementation require a thorough engagement at the values and reasoning levels of the conversation. The frontline negotiator is well advised to take the time necessary to explore the Common Shared Space as to ground technical arrangements in a sound and shared understanding of the respective positions, reasoning, and values between the parties.

Understandably, some negotiations may already have a strong focus on diverging values (e.g., on the visibility of an emblem) or diverging tactical reasoning and methods (e.g., on the terms of the distribution of the food) that will frame further discussion on the activities of the organization at a more technical level. This focus implies that negotiators on both sides will concentrate their energy on exploring the Common Shared Space at the technical level while paying attention to the implications at the other levels. For example:

The leader of the militia objects to the use of the logo of FWB on the convoys crossing the territory under his control. He requires that all displays of the FWB logo be withdrawn from the trucks.

The humanitarian negotiator must discern if the position of the militia results essentially from:

• A disagreement about where and when the logo is being displayed (technical level);
• A divergent understanding of how the logo is being used to identify the FWB’s convoy (on the door, on flags, on the roof top, etc.) (tactical/professional reasoning level); and/or
• A divergent understanding of the meaning and implications of the logo (values level).

Issues of logos tend to focus on the “message” the logo carries, notwithstanding the intent of the organization. In this case, the leader of the militia believes that the logo is offensive toward the local culture.

Depending on the level of engagement and trust, the humanitarian negotiator will focus the search for potential agreements on the most promising areas, i.e., where the relationship has most traction, selecting, alternatively, these search areas:

• V <-> V’: The organization already has good connections with militia members as well as with religious scholars and community leaders in the region. They may recognize the non-religious and non-political character of the logo;
• R <-> R’: The organization is recognized as a professional entity. Professionals in the region may vet for the professional use of the logo so as to identify the service of the organization and ensure the security of the personnel; and
• P <-> P’: The convoys of the organization are already operating and recognized in the region and can accommodate varying degrees of visibility of its logo in the course of its operations without hindering its security. It will require a more thorough management and notification process so as to avoid any misperceptions of the humanitarian and protected nature of the convoys.

In all cases, the first step is about understanding the perspective of the counterpart and seeing how to reconcile possible divergences at the various levels of engagement. (For a more detailed discussion on the various types and levels of engagement, see 1 | Tool 4: Determining the Typology of a Humanitarian Negotiation.)

Starting with Values: Reformulating divergent beliefs into shared values

Going back to the exploration of the Common Shared Space, this segment will focus on a systematic search for shared values.

Searching for shared values is about finding overlap between the structure of beliefs of both sides and reformulating these values into a common shared vocabulary. (For a more detailed discussion on engaging on values and norms, see 1 | Tool 5: Drawing the Pathway of a Normative Negotiation.) A key aspect of the process for humanitarian negotiators is to understand that they need to move beyond the rhetoric of “humanitarian principles” to be able to explain the meaning and relevance of each of the principles in the particular context. Humanity, Impartiality, neutrality, and independence are values and norms that belong to the humanitarian community, not the parties to an armed conflict. Yet, some aspects of these norms can certainly be shared if presented in a meaningful and relevant way in the eyes of the counterparts. Hence, humanitarian principles need to be unpacked and “translated” into a palatable vocabulary for the counterpart so he/she can recognize common beliefs. For example:

The same applies to tactical reasoning and professional methods which are measurable by their capacity to mobilize a consensus among peers on HOW the organization should operate in the affected territory. There are a number of procedures and mechanisms that make a lot of sense for humanitarians but have little resonance with counterparts. These methods need to be unpacked as well in order to become tangible points of the conversation so both sides may agree on how to handle the humanitarian needs of the population. For example:

Finally, the position of the organization should be communicated clearly so that the counterpart both understands where the organization stands and perceives its willingness to engage. (For more details, see Section 1 GREEN Fostering Legitimacy and Building Trust.) Introduction of technical terms can also launch a new tangent of discussion, especially in areas of chronic emergency requiring multi-year responses, where the humanitarian lexicon can be misinterpreted or misused by counterparts. Hence, one should avoid language in a position that pre-empts a conversation or closes the door to the exploration of potential agreements, such as:

• “Under international law, we have the right to …”
• “Our organization will never accept …”
• “This position is non-negotiable.”
• “We are not willing to discuss this point.”
• “This situation is unacceptable.” Etc.

The doctrine of the organization may indeed prohibit specific arrangements proposed by the counterpart. The leadership of the organization may even call for a denunciation of the action of the counterpart. Yet, the mandate given to the humanitarian negotiator is to engage in a conversation with the counterpart, explore possibilities, and build trust, not to prohibit or denounce their action. The mandator (e.g., country director of the organization) should be the one communicating the strong prohibiting messages. Organizations must maintain the credibility of the role of frontline negotiators by sparing them from acts of denounciation or intimidation towards the counterpart. Frontline negotiators must not hesitate to request or insist on this kind of support from the negotiation team in order to preserve their place and relationship with the counterpart.

It is well understood that there will be a time to set clear “red lines” and manage expectations, which is also part of the job of frontline negotiators. Yet, the conversation on red lines can take place only if and when the level of dialogue and the engagement between the negotiators are sufficiently developed. To start a conversation by stating the red lines is an act of power subjugating the Common Shared Space to the terms of one side. It is recommended therefore that the opening position focuses on stating what the organization wants and is not construed as a negative assertion (i.e., stating what the organization rejects) as a way to open a dialogue on the views of the other side without restrictions.

In this case, the range of options includes areas of potential shared objectives at each level of the negotiation. Discussions should allow the co-ownership of the Common Shared Space and see how it can address expectations on other elements in a second step.

With this analysis in mind, humanitarian negotiators are in a position to consider the design of scenarios, including the angle from which they intend to approach the counterpart, and the determination of proper bottom line and red line as presented in the next module.

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team

Introduction

The purpose of this module is to examine the relationship between the humanitarian organization and its counterparts within the social and political context of the negotiation. The goal is to explore ways to mobilize support among influential stakeholders and create a conducive environment for the counterpart to move toward the demands and expectations of the humanitarian negotiator.

In the previous modules, we have reviewed the position, tactical reasoning, and values of counterparts. Interest and motive analyses assume a degree of autonomy of counterparts in determining their position at the negotiation table. Yet, we acknowledge that positions in a negotiation process are also influenced by the environment in which the parties evolve as much as by their tactical reasoning and the value judgments of others over the issues on the table. Values in particular are understood as a community concern and are open for deliberations within the social network of the counterparts. It is therefore important to integrate into the analysis the role and perspectives of other stakeholders in a negotiation process as a significant source of leverage (positive or negative) on the determination of the counterparts’ position.

To this end we use the model of the so-called “mapping exercise.” This exercise should be conducted in collaboration with the negotiation team, as it requires discussing the relative positioning of actors on a political map, best achieved through a critical and informed discussion among the members of the negotiation team, especially local national staff who benefit from connections with, and understanding of, social and political actors. Mapping is of particular importance in cases where counterparts play a key political role in their community (e.g., high-level government officials, tribal leaders, military commanders, etc.) and who may, in such cases, gain or lose considerable authority and legitimacy from humanitarian negotiation. Their legitimacy is intrinsically based on their ability to balance the interests of opposing political forces under their recognized leadership. It is therefore important to map out these converging or opposing influences in the counterparts’ decision-making process on a particular issue and situate the position and role of the humanitarian organization in this context.

The risk of conflating humanitarian negotiation and other political processes, including political mediation, is therefore real to the point that one cannot remain oblivious to the political footprint a humanitarian organization may bring to bear on the power relationships between the parties and their stakeholders.

There is a growing confusion between the objects of humanitarian negotiation and the objectives of political mediation. Following the development of an integrative vision of the peacekeeping, political, and humanitarian roles of the United Nations in times of conflict, there have been increasing concerns over the use of humanitarian access and delivery as confidence-building/points of pressure with parties to hostilities. To remain neutral, humanitarian organizations need to proactively assess the political map of their intervention and ensure that humanitarian action is not being instrumentalized by other stakeholders. It is imperative that humanitarian negotiators take into account the potential costs and benefits of such relationships for the counterparts and their stakeholders.[1] To support such efforts, this module proposes a straightforward mapping tool in four steps:

1. The first step involves the creation of a mapping tool to situate the role and perspective of humanitarian organizations and stakeholders relative to each other on a specific humanitarian issue;
2. The second step assigns the main counterpart the position in the center of the map and places all the relevant stakeholders in the respective quadrants across the map;
3. The third step focuses on tactical schemes to guide the engagement of humanitarian negotiators with stakeholders to leverage their influence; and,
4. The fourth and final step helps prioritize mobilization efforts toward conducive connections among stakeholders that may support a positive outcome of the negotiation.

Mapping influencers is not a scientific exercise. It relies on layers of subjective assessments of interactions between stakeholders. The point of a mapping exercise is not to forecast the outcome of a negotiation but rather to help plan the mobilization of the positive influence over a counterpart. While humanitarian negotiators mostly know stakeholders in their immediate vicinity who may leverage a positive influence, they are generally unaware of the second- and third-degree influencers from other quarters who may have an interest in the humanitarian agenda. Humanitarian negotiators are “small fishes in a very large pond.” The proposed mapping should help the negotiation team to have a larger perspective on the influences and trends that may help or hinder their efforts.

Since a mapping exercise involves processing more data than one would usually do on his/her own, it relies on the greater availability of information and analysis that is possible in a team setting. The quality of the exercise resides essentially on the ability of the negotiator to reach out to other colleagues in the team as well as external contacts to gather and analyze data on the counterpart’s network of influence. Mapping is not a one-person exercise for the negotiator alone; the extent of data accessible necessitates that it is a group effort.

[1] For a discussion on the relationship between humanitarian negotiation and political mediation, see the Report of the 2017 Annual Meeting of Frontline Humanitarian Negotiators, CCHN, Geneva, pp. 30-36, at https://frontline-negotiations.org/annual-meeting-2017/.

In this case, the range of options includes areas of potential shared objectives at each level of the negotiation. Discussions should allow the co-ownership of the Common Shared Space and see how it can address expectations on other elements in a second step.

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team

Module D: Designing Scenarios and Bottom Lines

Introduction

The design of scenarios occurs when the preparatory steps of the negotiation planning process have been for the most part completed: the context has been analyzed; the interests and motives of the counterpart have been surveyed; and relationships with the counterpart and major stakeholders have been established. The relational stage of the negotiation has allowed for the elaboration of a series of tactical steps to engage with the counterpart in a dialogue. Yet, before engaging in the final stage of the negotiation, i.e., the search for an agreeable solution, the team should consider the limits of the negotiation set in the terms of the mandate based on the legal, institutional, professional, and moral frameworks of the organization.

Though working within a limited exploratory framework, the negotiator is tasked with finding a suitable agreement with the counterpart that will be compatible with the rules and policies of the organization. Setting up the red lines of the mandate frames the scope of options to be considered in a possible agreement. This module proposes some tools to plan the conversation on the description of red lines and bottom lines with the counterpart.

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team | Module D: Scenarios and Bottom Lines

Tool 13: Identifying the Shared Benefit of the Negotiation

A critical aspect of the design of scenarios is to contribute to a new mindset within and across the parties about the added value of an agreement for both sides. Arguably, any agreement could be characterized as a bundle of compromises. Unless the added value of an agreement can be measured on features other than mere gains and losses for the respective parties, it remains vulnerable to detractors who may condemn any sort of agreement as a “bad deal.”

To build a sense of ownership into the agreement and its implementation, one needs to demonstrate the creation of a shared benefit as the main outcome of the negotiation. For example, in the humanitarian sector, this added value can come from having an impact on the situation and population or demonstrating leadership in the domain. On the side of the counterpart, it should provide for a source of benefit as well, which would most likely be related to security, economic, or political interests, such as greater control over the relief operation, or legitimacy in the eyes of their own hierarchy or constituency. Multiple benefits can co-exist in the same agreement. The humanitarian negotiator and his/her team should therefore undertake an assessment of the interests and values of the counterparts as well as their constituencies to find the right point of connection for the shared benefit.

For the humanitarian organization, the starting position of the negotiation sits at the top of the organization’s iceberg, identified as the ideal outcome of the negotiation, where the benefit of the agreement for the humanitarian organization is maximized with little to no compromise required. However, as attractive as this position may look in absolute terms, it remains unrealistic since it does not take into consideration the interests and motives of the counterpart and does not involve any shared benefit.

As compromises to the “A” position are being considered (i.e., gradually moving away from the ideal outcome for the humanitarian organization):

• The potential benefit of the agreement for the humanitarian organization decreases up to a given point where there is no benefit to agree to a particular position.
• The same applies to the counterpart considering its compromises to A’ starting point.
• Conversely, the possibility of arriving at a viable agreement increases with the flexibility of coming to an agreement within the shared benefit window, enhancing a sense of joint ownership in the agreement.

In reality, what is considered to be shared benefit is relative to the number of issues being negotiated at the same time. Most negotiations address a bundle of issues and require smoothing the angles and adding scale to the shared benefits of a joint approach.

However, although compromises generate shared benefits for the parties to the negotiation at first, they also come with diminishing returns later on. The maximum shared benefit resides at the point where both parties have maximized their mutual interests in the issues on the negotiation table. Beyond that point, the discussion again becomes a zero-sum game—the greater the gain on one side, the lesser the benefit will be on the other, bringing down the shared benefit of the parties and sooner or later reaching the limit of the benefit of the most compromising party.

Taking as an example Food Without Borders (FWB) negotiating access to an IDP camp in order to address the food insecurity of the affected population:

• A = Ideal outcome of the negotiation: Food Without Borders wishes full access to the affected IDP population in the camp with no presence or control by the military during the food distribution.

This ideal position represents the best way to ensure the strict humanitarian character of FWB’s food assistance to the IDPs, recognizing the role of FWB as a neutral and impartial entity.

• Potential compromise “1”: FWB wishes full access to the IDP camp with a limited presence of the military in the camp during the distribution process.

This first degree of compromise appears to be a quick gain for FWB with the most benefit on the humanitarian organization side and limited cost on the humanitarian character of the assistance. The presence of the military is tolerated as long as they are not visible during the distribution process.

• Potential compromise “2”: FWB wishes full access to the IDP camp with the presence of the military actively monitoring the distribution process led by FWB.

This second degree of compromise is a somewhat more precarious position for FWB, affecting the perception of independence and neutrality of the FWB distribution process, yet not infringing on FWB’s capacity to distribute food to people in need. It also provides a benefit to the camp commander by ensuring an acceptable and visible level of control over the food distribution operation.

• Potential compromise “3”: Due to insecurity, FWB is ready to accept limited access to the IDP camp with a military escort. Providing a list of the beneficiaries to camp authorities is further required from FWB prior to the distribution process.

This third degree of compromise is much harder for FWB to agree with as it represents a significant compromise to the neutrality and independence of the organization, although not directly pre-empting the capacity of FWB to distribute food to all IDPs in need. However, FWB may not have the means of verifying that the assistance has reached those most in need. The benefit of the negotiation starts to decrease to a point where it may become unpalatable for FWB.

In other words, compromises come with a cost represented by the risks the compromises pose to the integrity of the humanitarian organization and its operations. As the humanitarian negotiator contemplates compromises, s/he should evaluate the rising risks for the organization.

The sources of these risks involve issues such as (but not limited to):

• Respect of humanitarian principles
• Security risks for staff
• Protection of the affected population
• Other legal norms (e.g., counter-terrorism legislation)
• Efficiency of distribution and other professional standards
• Reputational risks for the organization.

These risk sources are often analyzed as part of the organization’s mandate and/or institutional policies that provide the necessary framework for the negotiation (see 3 | Module B: Considering Institutional Policies and Red Lines). They are also an important topic of discussion with the negotiator’s support team.

Although all these options (1, 2, 3) may be palatable under the mandate of the humanitarian negotiator, there is a definite point where the negotiator may wonder if the benefit of the additional compromise is worth the additional risk. This natural bottom line of the negotiation (point B) is the point of equilibrium that represents a line set by the negotiator prompting a change in the dynamic of a conversation in which the negotiator may find himself/herself pressured into an increasingly compromising and risky posture while the shared benefits and ownership of the negotiation keep shrinking. A negotiation scenario on access to a conflict or insecure area is usually centered on absorbing more risks in terms of integrity of the organization and its personnel while observing a varying return in terms of humanitarian outcomes. The bottom line is situated when and where the diminishing return crosses the rising risk, calling for a pause in the dialogue with the counterpart to allow some reflection with the team and reconsideration of further compromises with the mandator.

As mentioned above, identifying a bottom line is a matter of evaluating the benefit/risk ratio of a particular negotiation in a specific context. Red lines are different: they are the product of institutional policies across contexts and are established at the outset of the negotiation process as fixed limits to the mandate of the negotiators. They are based on a doctrinal understanding of the tolerance of an organization to a set of compromises and associated risks. If they can be slightly modified in a dialogue with the mandator, they are unlikely to be moved significantly, even with the benefit of a high humanitarian return in a specific negotiation.

It may happen that a red line is set at a higher level than the point of equilibrium between shared benefit and rising risks as a matter of policy for the organization. For example, considering that military escorts are prohibited as a matter of institutional policy at the ICRC, the fact that many more lives could be saved through access with a military escort is unlikely to have much impact on the red line of the organization in a particular negotiation. Such a decision preempts a discussion between the parties on the risk/benefit of military escorts as this option has been discarded from the outset in the mandate. Further, there is also no point in having a bottom line on this issue.

However, a military escort may be seen differently by a local NGO implementing a government program than by the ICRC. In such case, a local NGO may be better suited to create a shared benefit with the counterpart than other international organizations that are subject to more restrictive institutional policies. The counterpart could try to pressure the more restrictive organizations into greater compromises on the basis of the tolerance to risks of the other organization. Yet, the negotiator with the more restrictive organization should not buckle to the pressure. The mandator and the hierarchy of the organization have already opted for the prominence of the reputation and integrity of the organization as a matter of policy over the long run, even at the cost to the affected population over the short run. The negotiator is not responsible for that policy decision and does not have permission to engage on it.

2 | The Negotiator’s Support Team | Module D: Scenarios and Bottom Lines

Tool 14: Evaluating Cost-Benefit of Options

The purpose of designing a scenario is to frame a conversation between the humanitarian negotiator and his/her support team to deliberate on the various elements of the negotiation tactics.

As compared to red lines, which are derived from the mandate of the negotiator, bottom lines are tactical tools at the disposal of the negotiation team to increase the chances of building a trustful relationship with the counterpart and maximizing the shared benefit of the negotiation, such that the negotiators on both sides can arrive at an agreement and implementation without having to refer back to an external authority. For example:

In line with the principles of neutrality and impartiality of FWB:

• Point A: The ideal outcome for FWB is that all food rations are distributed only to the affected IDP population based on their nutritional needs and that FWB can hire and pay in cash the day laborers of their choice to assist in its work in the IDP camp.
• Point B: The bottom line of the FWB negotiator is that food rations should be limited to IDPs but are not necessarily dependent on their individual nutritional needs. While not all IDPs suffer from the same level of malnutrition, general food distribution, with its possible conversion into cash by IDPs with limited or fewer needs, is seen as an acceptable risk. Regarding the hiring of local guards, FWB could consider including their family members in need as part of the food distribution process, even though they are not recognized as formal IDPs. Direct distribution to the local guards, however, is not permitted in view of their visible connection with the armed militia. The compromises outlined here, also show diminishing benefit for FWB as the connection between food assistance and the needs of the IDPs is getting lost.
• Point C: The red line according to the mandate given to the negotiator by FWB hierarchy is that FWB can only distribute food rations to the IDP population and other people in need. It cannot use the food rations as a means of payment of laborers. It further cannot provide any direct assistance to armed personnel. This position is consistent with the institutional policy of the organization prohibiting the use of food rations as a cash substitute for commercial transactions or compensation for labor. The concern of FWB across its operations is that food rations used as currency could appear to be a diversion of food aid and then be sold to the IDPs, creating a commercial interest in preventing the food from reaching those most in need, and making a profit for the sellers out of the IDPs’ malnutrition.

It is important to note that any compromise in the area between B and C, below the strict targeting of IDPs, will require further instruction from the mandator. FWB is rightly concerned about the reputational risks attached to food diversion and the fact that security guards may belong to a local militia active in the conflict, raising new concerns regarding the principle of neutrality. Discussing food distribution to family members of the security guards is below the bottom line (point B) but could be above the red line (point C) if the families of the guards are food insecure. In such case, the negotiator should refer to the mandator the request for food distribution to the guards, while explaining to the counterpart the limitations on FWB regarding the terms of the food distribution.

The reading of the situation in the case above could look like:

• The ideal outcome of the Camp Authorities (point A’) is to ensure the highest level of control over FWB’s presence and operation in the camp, requiring FWB to hand over distribution of the food to the camp guards and let them manage the process for a payment in food rations.
• The bottom line of the authorities of the camp (point B’) could be to allow FWB to manage the food distribution in the camp but only through the hiring of local security guards in the camp and providing their compensation in food rations. Any compromise below this point will require a consultation with the camp commander and the leader of the militia providing the security guards.
• The red line of the authorities of the camp (point C’) could appear at the point where they entirely lose control over the food distribution in the camp and become unable to share some benefit with the local security guards and their families as a side benefit for their work and allegiance.

Discussion of the modalities of payment to the guards proposed by FWB, e.g., to distribute assistance to the members of the local guards’ families in need and not to the guards directly, is probably above the red line of the camp authorities and the bottom line of their negotiator. The negotiator may probably agree on a scheme of distribution of food to the families of the guards, in exchange for which FWB will have full access to the camp with limited military presence.

In view of this assessment, the negotiator of FWB is in a position to draw the most likely scenarios of the specific negotiation:

Once the two lines of arguments are drawn, one can set the possible scenarios of the discussion.

Common Shared Space “D” + “E” + “F”: This is the shared space of potential agreements between the two sets of red lines, composed of:

• Area “D”: Area of potential agreement favoring mostly FWB but requiring the Camp Commander to refer back to his/her mandator;
• Area “E”: Area of potential agreement favoring both sides within the limits of the respective bottom lines; and,
• Area “F”: Area of potential agreement favoring mostly the Camp Commander but requiring the FWB negotiator to refer back to FWB hierarchy.

Within Area “D”, FWB may be pushing the conversation toward a more principled approach at the cost of the relationship with the counterpart as well as being likely to take more time. FWB negotiators could insist that:

• the security guards may take part in the distribution, but only as observers—they cannot handle the food rations;
• the families of the guards can receive food rations, but they will need to register with FWB, the same as everyone else.

This scenario implies that the counterpart is likely to require new instructions to agree and may raise the possibility of the politicization of the negotiation by the Camp Commander.

Within Area “E”, the two sides may come to an agreement within the mandate (the space between the two respective bottom lines, B and B’, as a shared space of open dialogue). In this case, the security guards can take part in the distribution and their families can receive additional rations to the extent they are food insecure.

Within Area “F”, the camp authorities may require, as a pragmatic step in the operation, that the food rations to be distributed to the families of the guards be handed over directly to the guards as a form of payment. This scenario implies that the FWB negotiator will have to refer back to the FWB hierarchy as it involves handing over food rations in a visible way to security guards who are also members of the local militia.

Other scenarios

The actual negotiation can be hard to predict. The scenarios mentioned above are based on the information collected so far. What seems clear is that scenarios that would not involve the security guards or full control of the distribution of aid by security guards are off the table. So, there is no point in pondering these possibilities for too long if FWB or the camp authorities are unwilling to move from their principled positions, affording little hope of finding an agreement.

On the Role of Stakeholders

A final point in drawing scenarios should be made regarding the role and influence of stakeholders. The position of the counterpart in a negotiation is as much the product of its relationships with influential stakeholders as of its interests and motives. Taking that into account, one should acknowledge that the actual scenarios of a negotiation are often a derivative of the objectives and tactics of other major stakeholders. In our case, the camp authorities may not be entirely free to set their red lines in view of the potential influence of armed militias supplying the local guards. The same applies to FWB, which remains very much under the influence of its donors and other humanitarian agencies. As one has analyzed the mapping of influence of the counterpart, one should also note that red lines of other actors, in particular, “spoilers,” may impact heavily on the openness of the counterpart to compromises. (For a more detailed analysis, see 2 | Module C: Network Mapping.)

Step 4: Discuss the preliminary script with the negotiation team

The final step is to create a script for entering into the transaction process. As the negotiator from HfA prepares the first messages and encounters, the team may consider the model introduced in 1 | The Frontline Negotiator on preparing and managing the transaction stage of the process:

1. clarify the terms of the transaction;
2. create a conducive environment for the transaction; and
3. address the human elements of the transaction.

In terms of substantive content, one may consider designing messages along a tier system, underscoring:

• Tier 1: Issues easily agreed to since they are at relatively low cost and high benefit for both the humanitarian organization and the counterparts, can serve to build a relationship with the counterparts, and can set a positive tone for the negotiation by addressing some of the inner motives.
• Tier 2: Issues on which an agreement comes at both some cost and some benefits for the counterparts and/or the humanitarian organization. The points of agreement can be used to establish the basis of a rational and fair distribution of cost/benefits.
• Tier 3: Issues that are more complicated to address and harder to solve because they come at a high cost for the counterparts or the humanitarian organization. These issues are often at the core of the conflict and frequently are harder to negotiate because they are close to or may fall below the respective red lines. Such issues should be kept in mind but be put aside at first so as to avoid confrontation on the positions that might hijack the negotiation process and reinforce the negative perception of the counterparts.

Considerations for the case at hand:

Multiparty Negotiation

Humanitarian negotiators are often engaged in multiparty negotiation where the terms of an agreement are influenced by an ongoing negotiation with a third party. Such negotiations create an interesting interaction between the two or multiple processes working in parallel and at times within different timeframes. The most frequent scenario involves humanitarian access to a siege where there are two parties—the besieging party and the party besieged; all three stakeholders have expectations in terms of control over the assistance provided within the besieged area.

Such a scenario calls for an adapted model with two counterparts in an interaction. For example:

Such circumstances call for the application of the tools of this module, but on a tripartite scale.